The history of philosophy is to a great extent that of a … clash of human temperaments. Undignified as such a treatment may seem to some of my colleagues, I shall … take account of this clash and explain … many of the divergencies of philosophers by it.
Of whatever temperament a professional philosopher is, he (sic.) tries when philosophising to sink the fact of his temperament. Temperament is no conventionally recognised reason, so he urges impersonal reasons only for his conclusions. Yet his temperament really gives him a stronger bias than any of his more strictly objective premises. It loads the evidence for him one way or the other, making for a more sentimental or a more hard-hearted view of the universe, just as this fact or that principle would.
He trusts his temperament. Wanting a universe that suits it, he believes in any representation of the universe that does suit it.
via Artemy Kolchinsky