The Equations of History

Some day I want to read all of Daron Acemoglu’s work. What in here isn’t interesting?

  • Social Structure and Development – A Legacy of the Holocaust in Russia
  • Theory, General Equilibrium, Political Economy and Empirics in Development Economics
  • Experimentation, Patents and Innovation Spread of (Mis)Information in Social Networks
  • Political Selection and Persistence of Bad Governments
  • Emergence and Persistence of Inefficient States
  • Vertical Integration and Technology: Theory and Evidence
  • Skills, Tasks and Technologies: Implications for Employment and Earnings
  • Persistence of Civil Wars
  • Dynamic Mirrless Taxation Under Political Economy Contraints
  • Institutions, Factor Prices and Taxation: Virtues of Strong States?
  • Political Limits to Globalization Price and Capacity Competition Foundations of Social Inequality (alternate access)
  • When Does Policy Reform Work – The Case of Central Bank Independence
  • A Theory of Military Dictatorships
  • Reevaluating the Modernization Hypothesis
  • Do Juntas Lead to Personal Rule?
  • Productivity Differences Between and Within Countries
  • Determinants of Vertical Integration: Financial Development and Contracting Costs
  • Economic and Political Inequality in Development: The Case of Cundinamarca, Colombia
  • Input and Technology Choices in Regulated Industries – Evidence from the Health Care Sector
  • Coalition Formation in Non-Democracies Income and Democracy
  • Capital Deepening and Nonbalanced Economic Growth
  • Local Indices for Degenerate Variational Inequalities Political Economy of Mechanisms
  • Persistence of Power, Elites and Institutions Oligarchic vs. Democratic Societies Markets Versus Governments
  • Incentives in Markets, Firms and Government Disease and Development: The Effect of Life Expectancy on Economic Growth
  • Disease and Development: The Effect of Life Expectancy on Economic Growth Appendices B and C
  • On the Stability of P-Matrices
  • Competition in Parallel-Serial Networks Partially Optimal Routing
  • Competition and Efficiency in Congested Markets
  • Generalized Poincare-Hopf Theorem for Compact Nonsmooth Regions
  • Equilibrium Bias of Technology Contracts and Technology Adoption
  • Technology, Information and the Decentralization of the Firm
  • Appendix to Technology, Information and the Decentralization of the Firm
  • A Simple Model of Inefficient Institutions
  • De Facto Political Power and Institutional Persistence
  • Did Medicare Induce Pharmaceutical Innovation? Modeling Inefficient Institutions
  • Efficiency and Braess’ Paradox under Pricing in General Networks
  • Price Competition in Communication Networks Competition in Parallel-Serial Networks Distance to Frontier, Selection, and Economic Growth
  • Economic Backwardness in Political Perspective
  • Politics and Economics in Weak and Strong States Institutions as the Fundamental Cause of Long-Run Growth
  • Constitutions, Politics and Economics: A Review Essay on Persson and Tabellini’s “The Unbundling Institutions The Rise of Europe: Atlantic Trade, Institutional Change and Economic Growth”
  • From Education to Democracy?
  • Market Size in Innovation: Theory and Evidence from the Pharmaceutical Industry
  • Women, War and Wages: the Effect of Female Labor Supply on Labor Market Outcomes
  • Kleptocracy and Divide-and-Rule: A Model of Personal Rule (The Alfred Marshall Lecture)
  • The Marginal User Principle for Resource Allocation in Wireless Networks
  • Why Not a Political Coase Theorem? Social Conflict, Commitment and Politics
  • Disease and Development in Historical Perspective
  • Patterns of Skill Premia Labor- and Capital-Augmenting Technical Change
  • An African Success Story: Botswana
  • Factor Prices and Technical Change: from Induced Innovations to Recent Debates
  • The Labor Market and Corporate Structure Institutional Causes, Macroeeconomic Symptoms: Volatility, Crises and Growth
  • Reversal of Fortune: Geography and Institutions in the Making of the Modern World
  • Directed Technical Change
  • The World Income Distribution Technical Change, Inequality, and The Labor Market
  • The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation
  • Inefficient Redistribution
  • A Theory of Political Transitions
  • Consequences of Employment Protection? The Case of the Americans with Disabilities Act
  • Deunionization, Technical Change and Inequality
  • Credit Market Imperfections and Persistent Unemployment
  • Changes in the Wage Structure, Family Income, and Children’s Education
  • Productivity Differences
  • Good Jobs Versus Bad Jobs
  • Wage and Technology Dispersion
  • Why Did the West Extend the Franchise? Democracy, Inequality and Growth in Historical Perpective
  • Political Losers as a Barrier to Economic Development
  • How Large Are Human Capital Externalities Evidence? Evidence from Compulsory Schooling Laws
  • The Choice between Market Failures and Corruption Productivity
  • Gains from Unemployment Insurance
  • Democratization or Repression? Certification of Training and Training Outcomes
  • Efficient Unemployment Insurance
  • Changes in Unemployment and Wage Inequality: An Alternative Theory and Some Evidence
  • Holdups and Efficiency Search Frictions
  • The Structure of Wages and Investment in General Training
  • Information Accumulation in Development
  • Beyond Becker: Training in Imperfect Labour Markets
  • Why Do New Technologies Complement Skills? Directed Technical Change and Wage
  • Property Rights, Corruption and the Allocation of Talent: A General Equilibrium Approach
  • Why Do Firms Train? Theory and Evidence
  • Credit Market Imperfections and the Separation of Ownership from Control
  • Asymmetric Business Cycles: Theory and Time Series Evidence
  • Was Prometheus Unbound by Chance? Risk, Diversification, and Growth
  • Training and Innovation in an Imperfect Labour Market
  • Matching, Heterogeneity, and the Evolution of Income Distribution
  • A Microfoundation for Social Increasing Returns in Human Capital Accumulation
  • Asymmetric Information, Bargaining, and Unemployment Fluctuations
  • Reward Structures and the Allocation of Talent

About isomorphismes

Argonaut: someone engaged in a dangerous but potentially rewarding adventure.
This entry was posted in Uncategorized and tagged , , , , , , . Bookmark the permalink.

Leave a Reply

Fill in your details below or click an icon to log in: Logo

You are commenting using your account. Log Out /  Change )

Google photo

You are commenting using your Google account. Log Out /  Change )

Twitter picture

You are commenting using your Twitter account. Log Out /  Change )

Facebook photo

You are commenting using your Facebook account. Log Out /  Change )

Connecting to %s